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#### Financial incentives are a direct transfer of resources with the effect of reducing the price for a non-government buyer an seller

Management Information Services 11 (The Nuclear Energy Institute, “60 Years of Energy Incentives: An Analysis of Federal Expeditures for Energy Development”)

A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, Creating or expanding a market for producers.

#### Violation - The affirmative plan gives funding – not an incentive because it’s not tied to a measurable performance target

Summerfield ‘7 (SUMMERFIELD 07, Brian, Senior Editor of Talent Management Magazine <http://www.talentmgt.com/newsletters/compensation_perspectives/2007/March/282/index.php> What Incentives Aren’t **When discussing incentives** systems, talent **managers need to make sure the proper meaning of the term is conveyed** **because occasionally it is misapplied.** The confusion isn't surprising — after all, "incentive" is quite broad, and sometimes people use the word to describe programs that don't **really** fit into that category. The following are categories within the overall compensation-and-benefits rubric that are not employee incentives in the narrow, talent management-related sense but might be considered as such in the more general understanding of the word. **Benefits** Things such as health insurance and pension plans **are definitely perquisites**, **but** they **aren't** really **incentives**. These programs are tied to the mere fact of employment, **not performance targets**. (Certainly, a salesperson isn't going to get more health coverage for exceeding a quarterly quota.) Rather, these programs are exactly what the name implies: benefits. Typically, benefits are aimed more at recruiting and retaining top-notch employees than at motivating them to achieve and surpass objectives. Fringe Benefits These are closely related to benefits but aren't quite the same — they could be called the icing on the benefits cake. Fringe benefits usually have more to do with what employees want than what they need, and they can range from an exciting and prestigious office location to a break room mini-fridge that's constantly stocked with soda. In spite of the slight dissimilarities between fringe benefits and benefits, they are not incentives for the same reason: They have more to do with attracting and keeping workers than encouraging them. Development Programs that help employees build up their knowledge and skill sets can be incentives in an indirect sense. In particular, individuals might work harder to qualify for a high-potential development program. But speaking generally, development is not an incentive, as its main purpose is to equip personnel with proficiencies they need to perform in their job. Motivation is secondary, if it's considered at all. Pay Compensation is a tricky one because, in a sense, it's the ultimate incentive — the paycheck is the reason employees show up to work in the first place. Most people cannot work for free and wouldn't be inclined to anyway. That said, where talent management is concerned, pay is based on work in the broader context. In other words, income is designed to induce employees to do their jobs and nothing more. What Incentives Are Defining something in the negative (as in, what it's not) can be illustrative, but it's not explicitly explanatory. So, then, what does "incentives" refer to in the compensation-and-benefits sphere? Specifically, **an incentive is** any monetary or nonmonetary **reward that aims to encourage a very narrowly defined performance or behavioral objective**. It can be applied at the individual, group, department or even enterprise level, but **it must be tied to some sort of measurable target**. It's purely motivational in nature. Some of you might be thinking, "Well, what about bonuses? Those are incentives, right?" That depends. An end-of-the-year bonus for the holidays wouldn't count as an incentive. Neither would an across-the-board bonus handed out to employees for exceeding profit forecasts after the fact. On the other hand, salespeople who work hard to exceed their quarterly quota to receive a cash reward are pursuing incentives. The point is that **incentives can't be arbitrary or routine, and the proposition must precede the achievement** (**e.g., "If you do X, then you'll get Y in return**.")

#### Financial incentives must disburse federal funds for energy production—mandates and regulations are indirect incentive—that crushes limits

Webb, sessional lecture – Faculty of Law @ University of Ottawa, ‘93

(Kernaghan, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501)

One of the obstacles to intelligent discussion of this topic is the tremendous potential for confusion about what is meant by several of the key terms involved. In the hopes of contributing to the development of a consistent and precise vocabulary applying to this important but understudied area of regulatory activity, various terms are defined below. In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean **disbursements18** **of** **public** **funds** or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of **grants, contributions**, repayable contributions, **loans, loan guarantees and** insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and **tax expenditures.19** Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration. By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

Limits

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#### 90% of the plan is the procedure of implementation. We can’t learn about most of the Affirmative

Elmore ‘80, Professor of Public Affairs at University of Michigan, Polysci Quarterly Pages 79-80

Analysis of Policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In the Normal Case, it was about 10%, leaving 90% in the realm of Implementation.

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**Immigration will pass – capital’s key**

Sink and Mali 3-25. [Justin, Meghashyam, reporters, "Obama: 'The time has come' to move immigration reform in Congress" The HIll -- thehill.com/video/administration/290129-obama-the-time-has-come-to-move-immigration-reform]

Obama said he expects debate on an immigration bill to “begin next month” at a ceremony where 28 people, including 13 armed servicemembers, became citizens.¶ Bipartisan groups in both the House and Senate are moving closer to unveiling separate immigration reform proposals, and the president is hoping to build momentum for a deal.¶ “We've known for years that our immigration system is broken, that we're not doing enough to harness the talent and ingenuity of all those who want to work hard and find a place in America,” Obama said. “And after avoiding the problem for years, the time has come to fix it once and for all. The time has come for comprehensive, sensible immigration reform.”¶ Speaking from the East Room, Obama argued that immigration strengthens the country.¶ “It keeps us vibrant, it keeps us hungry, it keeps us prosperous. It is what makes us such a dynamic country,” he said. “If we want to keep attracting the best and the brightest, we've got to do a better job of welcoming them.”¶ Advocates for immigration reform see a real chance for legislation to pass Congress this year, despite opposition from some House GOP lawmakers, many of whom have said they will oppose measures that grant “amnesty” to illegal immigrants and have questioned proposed protections for gay or lesbian couples.¶ Immigration reform is a potent political issue for Obama, who won more than 70 percent of the Hispanic vote in 2012. Since that showing, a growing number of conservative lawmakers have signaled they would back immigration reform, including measures to provide a pathway to citizenship.¶ Groups aligned with Obama have signaled their intention of pressuring Congress.¶ On Monday, The New York Times reported that Organizing for Action — the political group born from the president's reelection campaign — will launch a new online effort featuring the stories of some 7,000 supporters, some of whom entered the country illegally.¶ The Senate’s “Gang of Eight” introduced their framework, calling for a pathway to citizenship, heightened border security, increased high-skilled immigration and a guest worker program, in January.¶ But since then, senators have been tied down in negotiations over the details of the plan, with many key issues still unresolved.¶ Obama said he wanted to see debate begin on a congressional bill by April.¶ “We are making progress, but we've got to finish the job, because this issue is not new,” Obama said. “Everyone pretty much knows what's broken, everyone knows how to fix it.”¶ At a briefing later Monday with reporters, White House spokesman Josh Earnest insisted that the White House did not hold the event over concern with the progress of negotiations.¶ "We are pleased with the progress they are reportedly making" in the Senate, Earnest said, adding that President Obama had been in touch with members of the Gang of Eight.¶ Earnest also dismissed criticism from freshman Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who suggested over the weekend that Obama secretly hoped talks would fall through, so Democrats could gain a political wedge for the 2014 midterm elections.¶ "There's no evidence to support those claims," Earnest said.¶ Members of the Senate group predict their plan could move forward when legislators return from a two-week Easter break.¶ A bipartisan House group has yet to share details of their proposals, but their work has already received general support from leaders in both parties.

**New nuclear production causes massive political backlash and saps capital – any evidence pre 2011 is irrelevant**

Alex Trembath, Policy Fellow in AEL’s New Energy Leaders Project, 11 [“Nuclear Power and the Future of Post-Partisan Energy Policy,” Lead Energy, Feb 4, http://leadenergy.org/2011/02/the-nuclear-option-in-a-post-partisan-approach-on-energy/]

Nuclear power is unique among clean energy technologies in that Democrats tend to be more hesitant towards its production than Republicans. Indeed, it has a reputation for its appeal to conservatives -Senators Kerry, Graham and Lieberman included provisions for nuclear technology in their ultimately unsuccessful American Power Act (APA) with the ostensible goal of courting Republican support. The urgency with which Democrats feel we must spark an energy revolution may find a perfect partner with Republicans who support nuclear power. But is there anything more than speculative political evidence towards its bipartisan viability?¶ If there is one field of the energy sector for which **certainty of political will** **and government policy is essential**, it is nuclear power. High up front costs for the private industry, extreme regulatory oversight and public wariness necessitate a committed government partner for private firms investing in nuclear technology. In a new report on the potential for a “nuclear renaissance,” Third Way references the failed cap-and-trade bill, delaying tactics in the House vis-a-vis EPA regulations on CO₂, and the recent election results to emphasize the difficult current political environment for advancing new nuclear policy. The report, “The Future of Nuclear Energy,” makes the case for political certainty:¶ “It is difficult for energy producers and users to estimate the relative price for nuclear-generated energy compared to fossil fuel alternatives (e.g. natural gas)–an essential consideration in making the major capital investment decision necessary for new energy production that will be in place for decades.”¶ Are our politicians willing to match the level of certainty that the nuclear industry demands? Lacking a suitable price on carbon that may have been achieved by a cap-and-trade bill removes one primary policy instrument for making nuclear power more cost-competitive with fossil fuels. The impetus on Congress, therefore, will be to shift from demand-side “pull” energy policies (that increase demand for clean tech by raising the price of dirty energy) to supply-side “push” policies, or industrial and innovation policies. Fortunately, there are signals from political and thought leaders that a package of policies may emerge to incentivize alternative energy sources that include nuclear power.¶ One place to start is the recently deceased American Power Act, addressed above, authored originally by Senators Kerry, Graham and Lieberman. Before its final and disappointing incarnation, the bill included provisions to increase loan guarantees for nuclear power plant construction in addition to other tax incentives. Loan guarantees are probably the most important method of government involvement in new plant construction, given the high capital costs of development. One wonders what the fate of the bill, or a less ambitious set of its provisions, would have been had Republican Senator Graham not abdicated and removed any hope of Republican co-sponsorship.¶ But **that was last year. The** **changing of the guard in Congress makes this a whole different game**, and the once feasible support for nuclear technology on either side of the aisle must be reevaluated. A New York Times piece in the aftermath of the elections forecast **a difficult road ahead for nuclear energy policy**, but did note Republican support for programs like a waste disposal site and loan guarantees.¶ Republican support for nuclear energy has roots in the most significant recent energy legislation, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which passed provisions for nuclear power with wide bipartisan support. Reaching out to Republicans on policies they have supported in the past should be a goal of Democrats who wish to form a foundational debate on moving the policy forward. There are also signals that key Republicans, notably Lindsey Graham and Richard Lugar, would throw their support behind a clean energy standard that includes nuclear and CCS.¶ Republicans in Congress will find intellectual support from a group that AEL’s Teryn Norris coined “innovation hawks,” among them Steven Hayward, David Brooks and George Will. Will has been particularly outspoken in support of nuclear energy, writing in 2010 that “it is a travesty that the nation that first harnessed nuclear energy has neglected it so long because fads about supposed ‘green energy’ and superstitions about nuclear power’s dangers.”¶ The extreme reluctance of Republicans to cooperate with Democrats over the last two years is only the first step, as any legislation will have to overcome Democrats’ traditional opposition to nuclear energy. However, here again there is reason for optimism. Barbara Boxer and John Kerry bucked their party’s long-time aversion to nuclear in a precursor bill to APA, and Kerry continued working on the issue during 2010. Jeff Bingaman, in a speech earlier this week, reversed his position on the issue by calling for the inclusion of nuclear energy provisions in a clean energy standard. The Huffington Post reports that “the White House reached out to his committee [Senate Energy] to help develop the clean energy plan through legislation.” This development in itself potentially mitigates two of the largest obstacle standing in the way of progress on comprehensive energy legislation: lack of a bill, and lack of high profile sponsors. Democrats can also direct Section 48C of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 towards nuclear technology, which provides a tax credit for companies that engage in clean tech manufacturing.¶ Democrats should not give up on their policy goals simply because they no longer enjoy broad majorities in both Houses, and Republicans should not spend all their time holding symbolic repeal votes on the Obama Administration’s accomplishments. The lame-duck votes in December on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the tax cut deal and START indicate that at least a few Republicans are willing to work together with Democrats in a divided Congress, and that is precisely what **nuclear energy** needs moving forward. It **will require an aggressive push from the White House**, and a concerted effort from both parties’ leadership, but the road for forging bipartisan legislation is not an impassable one.

**Plan undermines political capital**

**Dorsi, 12**

(Fellow, Phillips & Cohen LLP & JD-Harvard Law School, “Clean Energy Pricing and Federalism: Legal Obstacles and Options for Feed-in Tariffs,” Spring, 35 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 173)

Although potentially challenging in the current Congress, establishing legislative authorization for a feed-in tariff could resolve most of the issues presented in this Article. A federally regulated feed-**i**n **t**ariff may be politically infeasible, and would be undesirable because of the variety of state and regional systems where it would need to apply. The need to take into account regional differences within a federal feed-in tariff scheme only adds to the political challenge. Additionally, since state commissions control the administrative infrastructure that implemented avoided cost rates for QFs under PURPA, state commissions could serve well again for feed-in tariffs. A simple legislative option to authorize feed-in tariffs would be to amend PURPA to permit states to set rates above avoided cost for particular units. Federal permission for state regulation carries the strongest defenses against court challenges because it waives the dormant Commerce Clause while displacing any federal preemption. Additionally, because the activity ultimately rests with the state, it does not risk a commandeering challenge. Such legislation would also render moot any utility's opportunity to challenge FERC's decision. If the federal government sought to direct state policy rather than to simply permit states to act, the federal government is limited, but has two primary options. First, the federal government could condition the grant of reasonably related funds to states on implementation of feed-in tariffs. The Court upheld this type of fiscal federalism with regard to highway funds and drinking age laws in South Dakota v. Dole. n125 Given current political conditions, such a policy seems politically challenging. A second option would be a cooperative federalism arrangement similar to the Clean Air Act. n126 Such an arrangement escapes the commandeering challenge by providing a backstop of federal [\*197] implementation should a state elect to not act. n127 Cooperative federalism in the model of the Clean Air Act, which codifies state plans in federal statutes, would also provide the opportunity to seek enforcement in federal courts. n128 However, in those instances where a state does not act, this policy would have the same faults as a federal feed-in tariff. What the federal government cannot do is require states to adopt feed-in tariffs. Given the recent treatment of FERC v. Mississippi, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would even permit Congress to require that states consider establishing feed-in tariffs. Advocates should not pin their hopes for renewable energy policy on the federal government. Congress, rather than exploring these policies, has recently discussed the possible relaxation or abolition of efficiency standards in order to ensure that customers can continue to purchase incandescent light bulbs. n129 At the same time, states have expanded their support for renewable energy. For example, in April 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown signed new legislation requiring California utilities to obtain a third of their energy from renewable sources. n130 Given the greater promise of state-level commitment to environmental policy, it is **worth exploring the options for states to act if the federal government stands still**.

**That kills Obama’s immigration push**

Amy **Harder**, National Journal, 2/6/13, In Washington, Energy and Climate Issues Get Shoved in the Closet, www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206

At a news conference where TV cameras in the back were nearly stacked on top of each other, an influential bipartisan group of five senators introduced legislation late last month to overhaul the nation’s immigration system. The room was so crowded that no open seats or standing room could be found. A week later, one senator, Republican Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, was standing at the podium in the same room to unveil her energy-policy blueprint. There were several open seats and just a few cameras. At least one reporter was there to ask the senator about her position on President Obama’s choice for Defense secretary, former Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel. “I’m doing energy right now,” Murkowski responded. “I’m focused on that.” Almost everyone else on Capitol Hill is focused on something else. Aside from the broad fiscal issues, Congress and the president are galvanizing around immigration reform. Four years ago, the White House prioritized health care reform above comprehensive climate-change legislation. The former will go down in history as one of Obama’s most significant accomplishments. The latter is in the perpetual position of second fiddle. “To everything,” Murkowski interjected fervently when asked by National Journal Daily whether energy and climate policy was second to other policies in Washington’s pecking order. Murkowski, ranking member of the Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said she hoped the Super Bowl blackout would help the public understand the importance of energy policy. “This issue of immigration: Why are we all focused on that? Well, it’s because the Republicans lost the election because in part we did not have the Hispanic community behind us,” Murkowski said this week. “What is it that brings about that motivation? Maybe it could be something like a gap in the Super Bowl causes the focus on energy that we need to have. I can only hope.” It will take more than hope. Elections have consequences, but so far the only kind of electoral consequence climate and energy policy has instigated is one that helped some lawmakers who supported cap-and-trade legislation to lose their seats in the 2010 midterm elections. For the pendulum to swing the other way—for lawmakers to lose their seats over not acting on climate and energy policy—seems almost unfathomable right now. Billions of dollars are invested in the fossil-fuel power plants, refineries, and pipelines that the country depends on today. The companies that own this infrastructure have a business interest in keeping things the way they are. Immigration reform doesn’t face such formidable interests invested in the status quo. “They [businesses] have employees—real, visible people—who they value and who they want to make legal as soon as possible,” said Chris Miller, who until earlier this year was the top energy and environment adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. On energy and climate-change policy, Miller added, “You’re probably never going to have anything like the fence in the Southwest or the border-control issue that pushes action and debate on immigration, because climate-change impacts will likely continue to be more abstract in the public's mind until those impacts are so crystal-clear it’s too late for us to do anything.” Another, tactical reason helps build momentum on immigration and not on other issues. Obama can capitalize on immigration as it becomes more of a wedge issue within the GOP. On energy and climate policy, Obama faces a unified Republican Party. “The president has cracked the code on how to push his agenda items through. He learned from his victories on the payroll tax and the fiscal cliff that the key is to stake out the political high ground on issues that poll in his favor while exploiting the divisions within the GOP,” said a former Republican leadership aide who would speak only on the condition of anonymity. “With this in mind, the next logical place for him to go is immigration. Unlike issues like energy or tax reform where the GOP is united, he can claim a big win on immigration reform while striking a political blow to Republicans.”

**Solves india relations**

Los Angeles **Times**, 11/9/**20**12 (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

**Solves south Asian nuclear miscalc**

Schaffer, Spring **200**2 (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

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#### Natural gas prices rising now and causing a transition to renewables

Crume ‘12 (<http://www.renewableenergymagazine.com/article/dash-for-gas-could-damage-renewables-drive>, “Dash for gas could damage renewables drive”, Richard, 5/23, accessed 3/12/13, Richard Crume, an environmental engineer by training, has worked for both corporate and governmental organisations in the energy and environmental fields for over 30 years. Additionally, he is an Adjunct Associate Professor at North Carolina A&T State University, where he teaches a graduate level course covering air pollution and climate change. Richard has written extensively on topics related to green buildings, sustainable energy, and waste management, and he is a member of the Board of Trustees for the Institute of Professional Environmental Practice. Additionally, he is a Certified Hazard Control Manager and Qualified Environmental Professional.)

#### The competition between natural gas and renewable energy is complex due to the interplay of evolving economic and political factors. For example, many countries are committed to expanding their renewable energy portfolios regardless of the price of natural gas and other fossil fuels. Germany already derives about 20 percent of its energy from renewables. And Japan, struggling to recover from last year’s devastating tsunami and nuclear plant meltdown, is now debating renewable energy targets of 25 to 35 percent by the year 2030. Additionally, there are reasons to believe that the pricing of natural gas will be less favorable in the future as a result of: Reduced natural gas supplies arising from increasing exports. Greater domestic demand associated with the construction of new combined cycle power plants. Increased government regulation of natural gas operations. High-priced drilling leases. Added precautions needed in some states like [North Carolina](http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/05/20/2075217/fracking-in-north-carolina-could.html) where a greater risk of groundwater contamination exists. Already there are [predictions](http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-2141174/Fuel-bills-rocket-winter-Japanese-tsunami-pushes-wholesale-gas-price-28.html) that wholesale natural gas prices in Britain may rise by as much as 28 percent this winter due to the diversion of liquefied natural gas supplies to Japan, where the nuclear power industry remains virtually shut down. It is clear that in the long run, natural gas, **a finite resource**, will experience diminishing supplies and higher costs, although the timeframe of this happening is difficult to predict. Another factor concerns evolving public opinion, both for and against fracking. The State of Vermont recently banned the technique, although this was largely symbolic, since the State has little or no natural gas reserves. Industry groups argue that actions like Vermont’s to restrict fracking will impede job creation, government revenues, and energy security, and such actions ignore the scientific facts that natural gas wells are clean and safe. In contrast to Vermont, many other states have given the gas industry a green light for further exploration and development, subject to regulation. Several states require disclosure of the chemicals in fracking fluids. While natural gas prices begin to stabilize or even rise over the next few year, renewable energy technology is becoming more cost-competitive. The capital and installation costs of solar photovoltaic systems dropped by more than half from 2007 to 2011, wind and hydro systems are already competitive in some markets, and promising technologies such as fuel cells and biogas are on the horizon. In 2011, for the first time, solar photovoltaic power was the top source of new electricity generation capacity in Europe, bettering natural gas and wind combined, according to a new report from the [European Photovoltaic Industry Association.](http://files.epia.org/files/Global-Market-Outlook-2016.pdf) Furthermore, distributed renewable installations like solar panels on factory roofs compete against retail power rates, and thus, are less threatened by wholesale natural gas prices. And large utility-scale solar and wind projects that are subject to fixed-price energy contracts, and that pass costs on to consumers in base rates, are potentially less susceptible to natural gas price fluctuations. A new [report](http://bakercenter.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Solar-incentives-and-benefits-_complete-report_May-1-2012-21.pdf) from the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy notes that historically, as new energy resources were developed in the U.S., a 30-year period of innovation and early adoption was required before beginning rapid growth. The report postulates that solar energy technologies are currently in the **rapid growth stage**, and the point has been reached where “government incentives can be most critical in helping new energy technologies become significant sources of energy production.” Cited examples of successful government engagement with the energy sector in the past include “market control measures for oil, making pipelines available for natural gas, the construction of flood control dams that provide the fuel for hydropower and states surveying their coal reserves.” The bottom line: Natural gas will remain an integral ingredient of our energy future for years to come. But the future is also bright for renewable energy, as natural gas prices stabilize or begin to rise, as renewable energy innovations

#### Nuclear power lowers natural gas prices

iStockAnalyst ’12 (“Weak Nuclear Power Output Should Support U.S. Natural Gas Prices”,

<http://www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/6165585/weak-nuclear-power-output-should-support-u-s-natural-gas-prices>, November 29, 2012)

U.S. natural gas sold off sharply in recent days, driven mostly by warmer weather forecasts. Bloomberg: - Gas dropped as much as 3.8 percent as forecasters including MDA Weather Services predicted above-normal temperatures for most of the lower 48 states over the next 10 days. Unusually cold weather helped reduce a supply glut this month. The December contract expires today. "The weather is moderating so it's wearing a little bit on the market," said Tom Saal, senior vice president of energy trading at INTL Hencorp Futures LLC in Miami. "We've got an expiring contract today, that could be part of it." Jan Henry Hub gas contract (source: barchart) The declines however should be limited due to reduced nuclear power generation. A large number of nuclear plants have been down unexpectedly and it may take time to bring them online. US nuclear generation is materially below normal for this time of the year, which should provide a floor to natural gas prices.

continue, and as public support grows for low polluting energy technologies.

#### Warming causes extinction

**Light ‘12** (Malcolm, PhD, University of London – Earth science and climate consultant, “Global Extinction within one Human Lifetime as a Result of a Spreading Atmospheric Arctic Methane Heat wave and Surface Firestorm,” <http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/p/global-extinction-within-one-human.html>)

Although the sudden high rate Arctic methane increase at Svalbard in late 2010 data set applies to only a short time interval, similar sudden methane concentration peaks also occur at Barrow point and the effects of a major methane build-up has been observed using all the major scientific observation systems. Giant fountains/torches/plumes of methane entering the atmosphere up to 1 km across have been seen on the East Siberian Shelf. This methane eruption data is so consistent and aerially extensive that when combined with methane gas warming potentials, Permian extinction event temperatures and methane lifetime data it paints a frightening picture of the beginning of the now uncontrollable global warming induced destabilization of the subsea Arctic methane hydrates on the shelf and slope which started in late 2010. This process of methane release will **accelerate exponentially**, release huge quantities of methane into the atmosphere and lead to the demise of all life on earth before the middle of this century. Introduction The 1990 global atmospheric mean temperature is assumed to be 14.49 oC (Shakil, 2005; NASA, 2002; DATAWeb, 2012) which sets the 2 oC anomaly above which humanity will lose control of her ability to limit the effects of global warming on major climatic and environmental systems at 16.49 oC (IPCC, 2007). The major Permian extinction event temperature is 80 oF (26.66 oC) which is a temperature anomaly of 12.1766 oC above the 1990 global mean temperature of 14.49 oC (Wignall, 2009; Shakil, 2005). Results of Investigation Figure 1 shows a huge sudden atmospheric spike like increase in the concentration of atmospheric methane at Svalbard north of Norway in the Arctic reaching 2040 ppb (2.04 ppm)(ESRL/GMO, 2010 - Arctic - Methane - Emergency - Group.org). The cause of this sudden anomalous increase in the concentration of atmospheric methane at Svalbard has been seen on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf where a recent Russian - U.S. expedition has found widespread, continuous powerful methane seepages into the atmosphere from the subsea methane hydrates with the methane plumes (fountains or torches) up to 1 km across producing an atmospheric methane concentration 100 times higher than normal (Connor, 2011). Such high methane concentrations could produce local temperature anomalies of more than 50 oC at a conservative methane warming potential of 25. Figure 2 is derived from the Svalbard data in Figure 1 and the methane concentration data has been used to generate a Svalbard atmospheric temperature anomaly trend using a methane warming potential of 43.5 as an example. The huge sudden anomalous spike in atmospheric methane concentration in mid August, 2010 at Svalbard is clearly evident and the methane concentrations within this spike have been used to construct a series of radiating methane global warming temperature trends for the entire range of methane global warming potentials in Figure 3 from an assumed mean start temperature of -3.575 degrees Centigrade for Svalbard (see Figure 2) (Norwegian Polar Institute; 2011). Figure 3 shows a set of radiating Arctic atmospheric methane global warming temperature trends calculated from the steep methane atmospheric concentration gradient at Svalbard in 2010 (ESRL/GMO, 2010 - Arctic-Methane-Emergency-Group.org). The range of extinction temperature anomalies above the assumed 1990 mean atmospheric temperature of 14.49 oC (Shakil, 2005) are also shown on this diagram as well as the 80 oF (26.66 oC) major Permian extinction event temperature (Wignall, 2009). Sam Carana (pers. com. 7 Jan, 2012) has described large December 2011 (ESRL-NOAA data) warming anomalies which exceed 10 to 20 degrees centigrade and cover vast areas of the Arctic at times. In the centres of these regions, which appear to overlap the Gakkel Ridge and its bounding basins, the temperature anomalies may exceed 20 degrees centigrade. See this site:<http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/map/images/fnl/sfctmpmero1a30frames.fnl.anim.html> The temperature anomalies in this region of the Arctic for the period from September 8 2011 to October 7, 2011 were only about 4 degrees Centigrade above normal (Carana, pers. com. 2012) and this data set can be seen on this site: <http://arctic-newsblogspot.com/p/arctic-temperatures.html> Because the Svalbard methane concentration data suggests that the major spike in methane emissions began in late 2010 it has been assumed for calculation purposes that the 2010 temperature anomalies peaked at 4 degrees Centigrade and the 2011 anomalies at 20 degrees Centigrade in the Gakkel Ridge region. The assumed 20 degree Centigrade temperature anomaly trend from 2010 to 2011 in the Gakkel Ridge region requires a methane gas warming potential of about 1000 to generate it from the Svalbard methane atmospheric concentration spike data in 2010. Such high methane warming potentials could only be active over a very short time interval (less than 5.7 months) as shown when the long methane global warming potential lifetimes data from the IPCC (2007; 1992) and Dessus, Laponte and Treut (2008 ) are used to generate a global warming potential growth curve with a methane global warming potential of 100 with a lifespan of 5 years. Because of the high methane global warming potential (1000) of the 2011, 20 oC temperature anomalies in the Gakkel Ridge region, the entire methane global warming potential range from 5 to 1000 has been used to construct the radiating set of temperature trends shown in Figure 3. The 50, 100, 500 and 1000 methane global warming potential (GWP) trends are red and in bold. The choice of a high temperature methane peak with a global warming potential near 1000 is in fact very conservative because the 16 oC increase is assumed to occur over a year. The observed ESRL-NOAA Arctic temperature anomalies varied from 4 to 20 degrees over less than a month in 2011 (Sam Carana, pers. comm. 2012). […] . This very narrow temperature range includes all the mathematically and visually determined extinction times and their means for the northern and southern hemispheres which were calculated quite separately (Figure 7; Table 1). Once the world's ice caps have completely melted away at temperatures above 22.49 oC and times later than 2051.3, the Earth's atmosphere will heat up at an extremely fast rate to reach the Permian extinction event temperature of 80oF (26.66 oC)(Wignall, 2009) by which time all life on Earth will have been completely extinguished. The position where the latent heat of ice melting curve intersects the 8 oC extinction line (22.49 oC) at 2051.3 represents the time when 100 percent of all the ice on the surface of the Earth will have melted. If we make this point on the latent heat of ice melting curve equal to 1 we can determine the time of melting of any fraction of the Earth's icecaps by using the time\*temperature function at each time from 2051.3 back to 2015, the time the average Arctic atmospheric temperature curve is predicted to exceed 0 oC. The process of melting 1 kg of ice and heating the produced water up to a certain temperature is a function of the sum of the latent heat of melting of ice is 334 kilo Joules/kg and the final water temperature times the 4.18 kilo Joules/Kg.K (Wikipedia, 2012). This however represents the energy required over a period of one second to melt 1 kg of ice to water and raise it to the ambient temperature. Therefore the total energy per mass of ice over a certain time period is equal to (334 +(4.18\*Ambient Temperature)\*time in seconds that the melted water took to reach the ambient temperature. From the fractional time\*temperature values at each ambient temperature the fractional amounts of melting of the total global icecaps have been calculated and are shown on Figure 9. The earliest calculated fractional volume of melting of the global ice caps in 2016 is 1.85\*10^-3 of the total volume of global ice with an average yearly rate of ice melting of 2.557\*10^-3 of the total volume of global ice. This value is remarkably similar to, but slightly less than the average rate of melting of the Arctic sea ice measured over an 18 year period of 2.7\*10^-3 (1978 to 1995; 2.7% per decade - IPCC 2007).This close correlation between observed rates of Arctic ice cap and predicted rates of global ice cap melting indicates that average rates of Arctic ice cap melting between 1979 and 2015 (which represents the projected time the Arctic will lose its ice cover - Masters, 2009) will be continued during the first few years of melting of the global ice caps after the Arctic ice cover has gone in 2015 as the mean Arctic atmospheric temperature starts to climb above 0 oC. However from 2017 the rate of melting of the global ice will start to accelerate as will the atmospheric temperature until by 2049 it will be more than 9 times as fast as it was around 2015 (Table 2). The mean rate of melting of the global icecap between 2017 and 2049 is some 2\*10^-2, some 7.4 times the mean rate of melting of the Arctic ice cap (Table 2). In concert with the increase in rate of global ice cap melting between 2017 and 2049, the acceleration in the rate of melting also increases from 7\*10^-4 to 9.9\*10^-4 with a mean value close to 8.6\*10^-4 (Table 2). The ratio of the acceleration in the rate of global ice cap melting to the Arctic ice cap melting increases from 3.4 in 2017 to 4.8 by 2049 with a mean near 4.2. This fast acceleration in the rate of global ice cap melting after 2015 compared to the Arctic sea ice cap melting before 2015 is because the mean Arctic atmospheric temperature after 2017 is spiraling upward in temperature above 0 oC adding large amounts of additional energy to the ice and causing it to melt back more quickly. The melt back of the Arctic ice cap is a symptom of the Earth's disease but not its cause and it is the cause that has to be dealt with if we hope to bring about a cure. Therefore a massive cut back in carbon dioxide emissions should be mandatory for all developed nations (and some developing nations as well). Total destruction of the methane in the Arctic atmosphere is also mandatory if we are to survive the effects of its now catastrophic rate of build up in the atmospheric methane concentration However cooling of the Arctic using geoengineering methods is also vitally important to reduce the effects of the ice cap melting further enhancing the already out of control destabilization of the methane hydrates on the Arctic shelf and slope. · Developed (and some developing) countries must cut back their carbon dioxide emissions by a very large percentage (50% to 90%) by 2020 to immediately precipitate a cooling of the Earth and its crust. If this is not done the earthquake frequency and methane emissions in the Arctic will continue to grow exponentially leading to our inexorable demise between 2031 to 2051. · Geoenginering must be used immediately as a cooling method in the Arctic to counteract the effects of the methane buildup in the short term. However these methods will lead to further pollution of the atmosphere in the long term and will not solve the earthquake induced Arctic methane buildup which is going to lead to our annihilation. · The United States and Russia must immediately develop a net of powerful radio beat frequency transmission stations around the Arctic using the critical 13.56 MHZ beat frequency to break down the methane in the stratosphere and troposphere to nanodiamonds and hydrogen (Light 2011a) . Besides the elimination of the high global warming potential methane, the nanodiamonds may form seeds for light reflecting noctilucent clouds in the stratosphere and a light coloured energy reflecting layer when brought down to the Earth by snow and rain (Light 2011a). HAARP transmission systems are able to electronically vibrate the strong ionospheric electric current that feeds down into the polar areas and are thus the least evasive method of directly eliminating the buildup of methane in those critical regions (Light 2011a). The warning about extinction is stark. It is remarkable that global scientists had not anticipated a giant buildup of methane in the atmosphere when it had been so clearly predicted 10 to 20 years ago and has been shown to be critically linked to extinction events in the geological record (Kennett et al. 2003). Furthermore all the experiments should have already been done to determine which geoengineering methods were the most effective in oxidising/destroying the methane in the atmosphere in case it should ever build up to a concentration where it posed a threat to humanity. Those methods need to be applied immediately if there is any faint hope of reducing the catastrophic heating effects of the fast building atmospheric methane concentration.

### 1nc

#### Text: the United States federal government should establish and fully fund an international fuel-bank under IAEA leadership.

#### Providing $100 million for a fuel bank consortium solves Iranian proliferation & regional Middle East proliferation:

Cirincione & Grotto ‘7 (Joseph Cirincione & Andrew Grotto, 2007 (Senior Associate and Director for Non-Proliferation @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senior National Security Analyst at the Center for American Progress <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/02/pdf/iran_report.pdf>)

The United States and its partners, as noted above, should support the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s effort to create a fuel bank consortium under IAEA leadership. NTI’s pledge of $50 million to the IAEA is contingent on other countries providing an additional $100 million to make the fuel bank a reality. The United States and its partners should provide such financing and immediately launch into discussions with the IAEA over the physical location of the fuel bank, its governing structure, and the conditions a country must satisfy to gain access to nuclear fuel. Such a consortium would serve three interlocking objectives. First, it has the potential to address Iran’s concerns about security of fuel supply. An international fuel bank that is country-neutral, durable, and governed by objective criteria is more likely to attract Iranian support than a sui generis mechanism created specifically to deal with Iran. Second, a fuel-bank push would head off the regional proliferation consequences of Iran suddenly announcing its nuclear- or near-nuclear capability. At the very least, the existence of a credible nuclear fuel bank would make it harder for Iran’s Sunni Arab neighbors to pursue any nuclear weapons ambitions under the guise of nuclear energy development. America must be willing to address Iran’s security concerns if it expects Iran to address America’s security concerns. Third, a nuclear fuel bank could serve as a first step towards more ambitious, global efforts to prevent the abuse of nuclear-fuel-cycle technology. That’s why the United States should press ahead with the fuel bank proposal with or without Iran’s support. This initiative would reduce the chances of a “virtual” arms race in the region by controlling the most sensitive component of the nuclear fuel cycle, uranium enrichment. The possibility that Iran may be left out of such an important initiative may also serve as an added inducement for Iran to forego uranium enrichment**.**

**1NC**

**Washington D.C., the fifty states, and all relevant territories should substantially increase financial incentives to the Department of Energy for downblending excess highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium for use in commercial nuclear reactors**

**Washington D.C., the fifty states and all relevant territories should amend their constitutions to extend their balanced budget horizon from one to five years.**

**50 state energy policy solves better, sparks federal modeling, and solves leadership**

**Northrop ‘8** (States Take the Lead on Climate, Michael Northrop, 06.03.08, director of the Sustainable Development Program at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.)

The federal government in the Bush era has done little to tackle our most pressing environmental problem — climate change. Yet there is one bright side amid Washington’s inaction: Many states have been stepping into the void and adopting comprehensive climate change policies that can be a model for the coming federal legislation to slow global warming. The **leadership of states** such as California, Arizona, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Florida is crucial not only because it **provides a template for federal** climate **legislation that will no doubt be adopted** under the next presidential administration. State action is also vital because among the top 75 emitters of greenhouse gases worldwide, half are U.S. states. Individually, the size of many of these state economies rivals those of most countries. State climate policy initiatives — though not yet implemented on a national scale — are collectively among **the most advanced** anywhere **in the world**. They provide a profound but largely unrecognized **platform for national action, and for a** potential **reassertion of global** environmental **leadership** by the United States. Indeed, state climate initiatives have provided hope to those in the global community who have waited patiently for the United States to engage meaningfully in international climate efforts. The decisive action of many states — 27 currently have or are developing comprehensive climate action plans — is taking on added importance for another reason: Innovative state climate and energy policies are showing skeptics in this country and in Congress that, rather than being a burden, ground-breaking energy conservation and renewable energy programs can create economic opportunity. Many of the more than 300 climate policies and mechanisms devised by various **states** **will** provide new business opportunities, as all sectors of society — housing, industry, commerce, energy, agriculture, forestry, transportation, waste management — adopt greater energy efficiencies and **move to** alternative sources of **energy**. Against the backdrop of inaction by the Bush administration and Congress, the states have moved farther and more rapidly than most people realize. Indeed, this September, ten mid-Atlantic and Northeastern states will begin implementing a cornerstone of effective national or global climate policy: A so-called “cap-and-trade” system under which emitters of greenhouse gases — in this case, power plants — must begin steadily reducing carbon emissions and can sell a portion of their emissions allotment once they begin implementing efficiencies. Power plants that fail to meet their emissions targets could buy allotments from more efficient utilities. As heartening as such moves are, the fact remains that the United States still needs a comprehensive national climate policy that will set national carbon reduction targets, put a national price on greenhouse gas emissions — either through a cap-and-trade system or a tax — and eliminate uneven standards among states. Proof that some federal action is needed can be seen in Texas, which is currently the sixth largest emitter of greenhouse gases worldwide, yet has not adopted a climate policy to reduce those emissions. Make no mistake, climate legislation is coming, though almost certainly not until a new presidential administration takes office. Climate change will be the subject of loud political debate on Capitol Hill this summer when the Senate considers America’s Climate Security Act — also known as Lieberman-Warner. But this will only be a dress rehearsal; few are under any illusion that final climate law will emerge from this initial exercise. In less than a year, however, this situation could easily be reversed. The new president will likely be a game-changing force, as all three top presidential contenders have committed themselves to tackling global warming. Also decisive might be the new movement of US governors who are publicly demanding a state-federal partnership to proactively address climate and energy issues. These demands were aired last month when 18 states signed such a declaration, issued at the Governors’ Conference on Climate Change at Yale University. The states’ record of fostering **groundbreaking** environmental **policies** that ultimately **evolve into national law is well established**. State innovation was, for example, at the heart of the battle against acid rain. State laws served as models for the federal Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and legislation creating Superfund sites. In addition to the cap-and-trade program that will be launched in September by the ten Eastern states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), two other regional groupings of states are working to establish carbon trading — the Western Climate Initiative and the Midwestern Governors Association. They have rolled up their sleeves, convened key stakeholders, and are hammering out the actual details of how to establish and implement an effective cap-and-trade mechanism. This is wisdom that would go a long way in Washington as lawmakers debate Lieberman-Warner, which would create a national cap-and-trade program. One important element of the debate on Capitol Hill concerns the formula for allocating or auctioning carbon credits, and a number of states have developed valuable expertise on this issue. A RGGI expert working group, for instance, conducted an in-depth analysis on the subject, and many states have already made the crucial choice to auction 100% of carbon credits under RGGI trading. Under this system, northeastern utilities would purchase credits, or allowances, permitting them to emit CO2 at current levels, with requirements for steady reductions. As the utilities lower CO2 emissions, they can sell the credits to utilities that have made slower cutbacks. The RGGI auction proceeds would be used to help vulnerable citizens defray higher energy costs, to support energy efficiency programs, and to invest in renewable energy projects — all preferable to offering free emission allocations to major polluters. As it now stands, Lieberman-Warner calls for doling out a significant percentage of free emissions permits to major emitters of greenhouse gases. [View interactive map](file:///G:\gas)  Center for Climate Strategies Climate policy by state But the states have far more to offer. They also have approved a host of energy-efficiency measures affecting all sectors of the economy. For example, one set of policies provides both emissions reductions and substantial economic savings from the building sector through improved building codes, insulation and weatherization programs, and lighting retrofits. From the waste management sector, waste reduction and recycling programs yield similar two-pronged benefits. These policies go hand-in-hand with others mandating that an increasing percentage of a state’s energy come from renewable sources, such as solar and wind power. Many states — chief among them California — have shown similar national leadership by significantly toughening auto emissions standards, leading Congress to increase national vehicle standards last December and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to challenge the states in court. The fact that so many states are acting with a similar impetus begs an important question: What would happen if you aggregated these policies and applied them on a national scale? One study conducted by the Center for Climate Strategies (CCS) — a non-partisan group that has worked on climate policymaking and analysis with many of these states — indicates that the adoption of a comprehensive, nationwide climate and energy policy would have substantial economic benefits. Using data from 12 states that are leaders in the field of climate change and energy, CSS calculated that **were all 50 states to adopt similar rules and legislation**, the aggregate economic savings would be $**25 billion**. The nation could achieve a 33% reduction in projected greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 — a common interim target — and save money doing so. Overall, the 27 states that have either adopted or are working on climate plans have targeted greenhouse gas reductions of 50 to 85 percent between 2040 and 2100, and their shorter term projections place them on this path. The states’ experiences also can be incorporated into a national cap-and-trade scheme. For example, in the first phase of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme, the cap-and-trade mechanism increased costs without reducing emissions. Carbon credits had been over-allocated, so there was little pressure to make reductions; emitters, however, realized profits by passing on the cost of carbon credits to consumers, even though the credits had been given to them for free. Although a recalibration has since occurred and the lessons learned are being incorporated, it seems reasonable to expect that a US cap-and-trade system will encounter similar trials. The crafting of climate plans at the state level has been based upon a model of bipartisan consensus-building. Utility executives, trucking interests, builders, business leaders, and others have worked face-to-face with environmentalists and non-profit public interest groups to develop policy solutions that were in most cases adopted unanimously. One reason for that is simple: There is mounting evidence that these policies will create new jobs and promote broad economic development. As a result, back in the home districts of Congressional representatives, governors have created an **informed network of stakeholders committed to** responsible climate action and ready to support **a needed national response.**

**Expanding the Balanced Budget horizon from one to five years solves state budget shortfalls**

**Ruffini 9** (Patrick, Republican online strategist, “The Solution to the state fiscal crisis: a five year balanced budget?”, Next Right, 2/22/09, <http://www.thenextright.com/patrick-ruffini/the-solution-to-the-state-fiscal-crisis-a-five-year-balanced-budget>)

Back in the Contract with America days, a Balanced Budget Amendment was a major tenet of Republican policy, and a couple of times, it came close enough to passing Congress to inspire furious lobbying and vitriolic sky-is-falling claims from the Democrats. A balanced budget requirement isn't some radical pie-in-the-sky idea. 49 out of 50 states have it. The good news is that it works -- those states are actually forced to balance their budget. The bad news is that it's often ugly, with drastic spending cuts and tax increases in many states in the current budget year. Albeit more responsible than rampant deficit spending at the federal level, the states aren't any less short term in their thinking than the feds. In good years, state governments rush to spend the surplus only to **abruptly cancel programs** in a recession -- because there's no real incentive to bank surpluses against a downturn or use state rainy day funds. A budget $5 billion in surplus is just as balanced as one with $0 in surplus, so the politicians might as well spend the money currying favor with voters. The only way I can think of to stop this problem is to extend the horizon of the balanced budget **from one year to five years**. Essentially, the budget would have to be in balance over the course of 5 years, covering most recessions with 2 or 3 years of recovery. **In bad times, states could deficit spend** -- by no more than the surpluses of the previous four years. **In good times, states would be forced to bank surpluses** -- particularly if the past few years were economically tough. One downside is that politicians use it to recreate the present, with budgets just barely in balance across the board, but more likely than not, the politically convenient thing to do would be to slip into a deficit for one or two years, thus kicking off a virtuous circle where subsequent years' budgets would not only have to be in balance, but the extra debt accumulated during a recession would have to be paid off. This could head off irresponsible spending binges in good times and keep state budgets on more of an even keel. It's true that budgets wouldn't have to be balanced every year -- though the overall fiscal impact is the same -- but it sure beats the farce of Washington needing to bail out the states when they run off the rails.

**1NC**

The United States federal government should allocate funding to the DOE for downblending and dismantlement without increasing the amount of electricity produced from commercial nuclear power plans. The President should direct the Department of Energy to accelerate the downblending rate of the approximately 90 MT of HEU that has already been designated surplus and scheduled for downblending so that the process is completed by 2015 rather than 2050. The National Nuclear Security Administration should increase the dismantlement rate at the Pantex Plant in Texas—up to 800-1,000 weapons per year—and open up the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly known as the Nevada Test Site) for additional dismantlement activities to allow the backlog of 4,500 warheads to be dismantled by 2015. 3.

**Solves and doesn’t increase funding**

**Stockton, 12**

(Consultant-Project on Government Overight & Former Special Assistant to DOE Secretary Bill Richardson, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: How the Country Can Profit and Become More Secure by Getting Rid of Its Surplus Weapons-Grade Uranium, http://pogoarchives.org/m/nss/downblending/report-20100914.pdf)

The President should direct the Department of Energy to accelerate the downblending rate of the approximately 90 MT of HEU that has already been designated surplus and scheduled for downblending so that the process is completed by 2015 rather than 2050. To accomplish this, the National Nuclear Security Administration should increase the dismantlement rate at the Pantex Plant in Texas—up to 800-1,000 weapons per year—and open up the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly known as the Nevada Test Site) for additional dismantlement activities to allow the backlog of 4,500 warheads to be dismantled by 2015. 3. Congress should appropriate additional funds to DOE for downblending and dismantlement.

Energy production must increase electricity generation

**Direskeneli 10** (Haluk, Journal of Turkish Weekly, " On Thermal Power Plants at our Backyard," <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3331/on-thermal-power-plants-at-our-backyard.html>)

Energy production is essential, it is mandatory to increase electricity generation for everyone. Everybody wants more electricity, but no one wants power plants in his/her backyard, even wind power plants since they create a lot of noise.

### ADVANTAGE ONE

#### Zero risk of terrorism- their impact is alarmism

Mueller ’12 (John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, The Terrorism Delusion, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 81–110, Summer 2012)

Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. In 2005 an FBI report found that, despite years of well-funded sleuthing, the Bureau had yet to uncover a single true al-Qaida sleeper cell in the United States. The report was secret but managed to be leaked. Brian Ross, “Secret FBI Report Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities: No ‘True’ Al Qaeda Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S.,” ABC News, March 9, 2005. Fox News reported that the FBI, however, observed that “just because there’s no concrete evidence of sleeper cells now, doesn’t mean they don’t exist.” “FBI Can’t Find Sleeper Cells,” Fox News, March 10, 2005. Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002. 47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” 48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000. 49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders. 50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs. Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin. There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones. 52

**No card post Osama Bin Laden dying**

#### Wont’ be HEU

Mueller ’11 (John, IR Professor at Ohio State, PhD in pol sci from UCLA, The Truth about Al Qaeda, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show>, August 2, 2011)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.

#### No Retaliation

Jenks-Smith and Herron ‘5 (Hank and Kerry, Professor and adjunct professor at George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. “United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or Bedrock?”, Review of Policy Research, Lexis, September 2005)

Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our data show that support for using conventional United States military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, panelists both in 2001 and 2002 preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.

#### No prolif or cascades, and the timeframe is huge – their ev is biased

Kahl 13 – Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Colin H., Melissa G. Dalton, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, February, “If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf>)

\*\*\*cites Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR\*\*\*

I I I . LESSONS FRO M HISTOR Y Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have started down the nuclear path have found the road more difficult than imagined, both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Analysts predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives. Yet, as it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh the potential benefits.19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state’s leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time, the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly declined.26 Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran’s program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970, even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival’s acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but leaders have to weigh these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear weapons will produce strains in strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the United States (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly reduced proliferation proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.

No impact to accidents

**No impact**

**WNA ’11** [World Nuclear Association, “Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors”, (updated December 2011), <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf06.html>]

From the outset, there has been a strong awareness of the potential hazard of both nuclear criticality and release of radioactive materials from generating electricity with nuclear power. As in other industries, the design and operation of nuclear power plants aims to **minimise the likelihood of accidents**, and avoid major human consequences when they occur. There have been three major reactor accidents in the history of civil nuclear power - Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. One was contained without harm to anyone, the next involved an intense fire without provision for containment, and the third severely tested the containment, allowing some release of radioactivity. These are the only major accidents to have occurred in over 14,500 cumulative reactor-years of commercial nuclear power operation in 32 countries. The risks from western nuclear power plants, in terms of the consequences of an accident or terrorist attack, are minimal compared with other commonly accepted risks. Nuclear power **plants are very robust**.

oceans

#### Oceans resilient

Kennedy ‘2 (Victor, Environmental science prof, Maryland, Former Director, Cooperative Oxford Laboratory, PhD, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change, <http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm>, 2002)

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

### ADVANTAGE TWO

General

**Sequester kills the defense-industrial base- it’s here now**

Moore ‘13 (Jack, Pentagon Budget Solutions, "Are contractors exaggerating sequestration impact?", www.budgetpriorities.org/are-contractors-exaggerating-sequestration-impact-federalnewsradio-com/, February 12, 2013, mss)

The threat of sequestration has put the defense-industrial base “at risk,” AIA’s Blakey wrote in a letter this week to President Barack Obama and congressional leadership. The cuts could make it harder for the industry to attract a strong workforce and weaken the nation’s global competitive edge, she wrote. And in a interview on In Depth with Francis Rose last week, Blakey said contractors are are already feeling the budget squeeze. “It really is something that is not just looming; it’s on top of us,” she said. “Pink slips are going out. Programs that would normally be moving ahead in places like Newport News at the shipyards are not because we really are at a point where these kinds of significant — I mean major — cuts to Defense as well as across the federal budget are already something the companies are having to take action on.”

**No impact to naval power**

Tillman ‘9 (Barrett Tillman, Historian specializing in naval and aviation topics, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, “Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era,” <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1896>, 2009)

In attempting to justify a Cold War force structure, many military pundits cling to the military stature of China as proof of a possible large conventional-war scenario against a pseudo-peer rival. Since only China possesses anything remotely approaching the prospect of challenging American hegemony—and only in Asian waters—Beijing ergo becomes the "threat" that justifies maintaining the Cold War force structure. China's development of the DF-21 long-range antiship ballistic missile, presumably intended for American carriers, has drawn much attention. Yet even granting the perfection of such a weapon, the most obvious question goes begging: why would China use it? Why would Beijing start a war with its number-two trading partner—a war that would ruin both economies?10 Furthermore, the U.S. Navy owns nearly as many major combatants as Russia and China combined. In tonnage, we hold a 2.6 to 1 advantage over them. No other coalition—actual or imagined—even comes close. But we need to ask ourselves: does that matter? In today's world the most urgent naval threat consists not of ships, subs, or aircraft, but of mines-and pirates.11

Disease

#### No impact to disease

Posner ‘5 (Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmske/is_3_11/ai_n29167514/pg_2?tag=content;col1>, March 11, 2005)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extiinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

#### Biow

#### Worst case has already happened

Dove ‘12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so **this** release over the world’s largest city really **represented a worst-case scenario**.¶ **Nobody got sick** or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

#### Emp

#### Zero risk of an EMP attack

STRATFOR ‘10 (Stratfor, “ Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,” <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100908_gauging_threat_electromagnetic_pulse_emp_attack>, September 9, 2010)

In order to have the best chance of causing the type of immediate and certain EMP damage to the United States on a continent-wide scale, as discussed in many media reports, a nuclear weapon (probably in the megaton range) would need to be detonated well above 30 kilometers somewhere over the American Midwest. Modern commercial aircraft cruise at a third of this altitude. Only the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China possess both the mature warhead design and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to conduct such an attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed that capability for decades. (Shorter range missiles can achieve this altitude, but the center of the United States is still 1,000 kilometers from the Eastern Seaboard and more than 3,000 kilometers from the Western Seaboard — so just any old Scud missile won’t do.) The HEMP threat is nothing new. It has existed since the early 1960s, when nuclear weapons were first mated with ballistic missiles, and grew to be an important component of nuclear strategy. Despite the necessarily limited understanding of its effects, both the United States and Soviet Union almost certainly included the use of weapons to create HEMPs in both defensive and especially offensive scenarios, and both post-Soviet Russia and China are still thought to include HEMP in some attack scenarios against the United States. However, there are significant deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons in a HEMP attack against the United States, and nuclear weapons have not been used in an attack anywhere since 1945. Despite some theorizing that a HEMP attack might be somehow less destructive and therefore less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response, such an attack against the United States would inherently and necessarily represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and the idea that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any actor contemplating a HEMP attack would have to assume not that they might experience some limited reprisal but that the U.S. reprisal would be full, swift and devastating. Countries that build nuclear weapons do so at great expense. This is not a minor point. Even today, a successful nuclear weapons program is the product of years — if not a decade or more — and the focused investment of a broad spectrum of national resources. Nuclear weapons also are developed as a deterrent to attack, not with the intention of immediately using them offensively. Once a design has achieved an initial capability, the focus shifts to establishing a survivable deterrent that can withstand first a conventional and then a nuclear first strike so that the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose as a deterrent to attack. The coherency, skill and focus this requires are difficult to overstate and come at immense cost — including opportunity cost — to the developing country. The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP as somehow less hostile than the use of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city is not something a country is likely to gamble on. In other words, for the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.

#### 1NC/ 2AC- Nuclear Primacy

#### No scenario for losing deterrence

Kristensen ‘12 -- FAS nuclear weapons expert [Hans, "DOD: Strategic Stability Not Threatened Even by Greater Russian Nuclear Forces," FAS, 10-10-12, www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2012/10/strategicstability.php, accessed 1-27-13, mss]

DOD: Strategic Stability Not Threatened Even by Greater Russian Nuclear Forces A Department of Defense (DOD) report on Russian nuclear forces, conducted in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and sent to Congress in May 2012, concludes that even the most worst-case scenario of a Russian surprise disarming first strike against the United States would have “little to no effect” on the U.S. ability to retaliate with a devastating strike against Russia. I know, even thinking about scenarios such as this sounds like an echo from the Cold War, but the Obama administration has actually come under attack from some for considering further reductions of U.S. nuclear forces when Russia and others are modernizing their forces. The point would be, presumably, that reducing while others are modernizing would somehow give them an advantage over the United States. But the DOD report concludes that Russia “would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or breakout scenario under the New START Treaty” (emphasis added). The conclusions are important because the report come after Vladimir Putin earlier this year announced plans to produce “over 400” new nuclear missiles during the next decade. Putin’s plan follows the Obama administration’s plan to spend more than $200 billion over the next decade to modernize U.S. strategic forces and weapons factories. The conclusions may also hint at some of the findings of the Obama administration’s ongoing (but delayed and secret) review of U.S. nuclear targeting policy. No Effects on Strategic Stability The DOD report – Report on the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation Pursuant to Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 – was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. It describes the U.S. intelligence community’s projection for the likely development of Russian nuclear forces through 2017 and 2022, the timelines of the New START Treaty, and possible implications for U.S. national security and strategic stability. Much of the report’s content was deleted before release – including general and widely reported factual information about Russian nuclear weapons systems that is not classified. But the important concluding section that describes the effects of possible shifts in the number and composition of Russian nuclear forces on strategic stability was released in its entirety. The section “Effects on Strategic Stability” begins by defining that stability in the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation depends upon the assured capability of each side to deliver a sufficient number of nuclear warheads to inflict unacceptable damage on the other side, even with an opponent attempting a disarming first strike. Consequently, the report concludes, “the only Russian shift in its nuclear forces that could undermine the basic framework of mutual deterrence that exists between the United States and the Russian Federation is a scenario that enables Russia to deny the United States the assured ability to respond against a substantial number of highly valued Russian targets following a Russian attempt at a disarming first strike” (emphasis added). The DOD concludes that such a first strike scenario “will most likely not occur.” But even if it did and Russia deployed additional strategic warheads to conduct a disarming first strike, even significantly above the New START Treaty limits, DOD concludes that it “would have little to no effects on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture” (emphasis added). In fact, the DOD report states, the “Russian Federation…would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or breakout scenario under the New START Treaty, primarily because of the inherent survivability of the planned U.S. Strategic force structure, particularly the OHIO-class ballistic missile submarines, a number of which are at sea at any given time.” Implications These are BIG conclusions with BIG implications. They reaffirm conclusions made by DOD in 2010 [http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/executive-report-111-06-treaty-with-russia-on-measures-for-further-reduction-and-limitation-of-strategic-offensive-arms-the-new-start-treaty], but the new report is important because it comes after Russia earlier this year announced plans to produce “over 400” nuclear missiles over the next decade. In the real world, however, Russian nuclear forces are not increasing. Even with Putin’s missile production plan, simultaneous retirement of older missile will continue the downward trend and result in a net reduction of Russian strategic nuclear forces over the next decade and a half. This fact has not stopped some from arguing against additional U.S. nuclear reductions. Their argument is that reductions are unwise at a time when Russia and others are modernizing their nuclear forces. Others have even argued that Russia could break out of the New START Treaty by cheating and presumably achieve some strategic advantage. Even the U.S. Senate’s advice and consent resolution that in 2010 approved the New START Treaty required that “the President should regulate reductions in United States strategic offensive arms so that the number of accountable strategic offensive arms under the New START Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no case exceeds the comparable number of accountable strategic offensive arms possessed by the United States to such an extent that a strategic imbalance endangers the national security interests of the United States” (emphasis added). A similar obsession with numbers was echoed in the 2012 report by the State Department’s International Strategic Advisory Board on future U.S.-Russian “Mutual Assured Stability,” which concluded that it requires some “rough parity” of nuclear forces. (A similar number obsession has evolved with NATO about non-strategic nuclear weapons, but that’s another story). But the DOD report appears to conclude that such warnings and parity requirement are missing the point. Strategic stability and deterrence today are provided by a secure retaliatory capability, primarily ballistic missile submarines. In fact, although ICBMs and bombers also play a role in the U.S. nuclear posture, they seem oddly absent from the report’s description of what is required to maintain strategic stability based on a sufficient secure retaliatory capability. Retaining that capability, it seems, does not even require the ballistic missile submarines to be on alert (although the report doesn’t explicitly say so). It only requires that a sufficient number of submarines “are at sea” and secure at any given time – or perhaps even only in a crisis. Likewise, the conclusion that a Russian disarming first strike “will most likely not occur” may be obvious to most but, if formal, seems to remove the need for having ICBMs on alert, as long as a sufficient number of submarines are at sea to provide the basic deterrence that underpins strategic stability.